Right of Appeal is a Statutory Right

Ganga Bai vs Vijay Kumar & Ors 

1974 AIR SC 1126, 1974 SCR (3) 882

http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1350326/

There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril,_bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal lies only as against a decree or as against an order passed under, rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Order 43, Rule 1.

No appeal can lie against a mere finding for the simple reason that the Code does not provide for any such appeal

Vijay Prakash D. Mehta & Anr vs Collector Of Customs 
1988 AIR 2010, 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 434
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1958793/

Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. 

It is not the law that adjudication by itself following the rules of natural justice would be violative of any right- constitutional or statutory, without any right of appeal, as such. If the statute gives a right to appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfilment of those conditions that the right becomes vested and exercisable to the appellant.

Devolution of an estate on the widow - Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937

Gangadhar Rout And Anr. vs Subhashini Bewa And Ors AIR 1955 Ori 135
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/333388/

Section 3 of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 193, relevant sub-sections are :

"(2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than the Dayabhag school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had'. 

(3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu Widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner." 

"The widow's right is a statutory right"

Devolution of an estate, on the widow, under Section 3(2) of the Act is neither by survivorship nor by inheritance, but is a special right created in favour of the widow by the Statute. She is not a coparcener in the family, nor is she a joint tenant with the coparceners. Her interest lapses, on her death, not to her husbands heirs but to her reversioners, namely, the other coparceners. 

She cannot be the Karta of the family by reason of the limited estate that she acquires, nor can she call upon the manager to account for the income of the family. She cannot question the alienation made by the manager for justifying necessity. In other words, her interest in the property remains just as it was before the passing of the Act, except that under the Act she can call for a partition and reduce her husband's interest to separate possession. 

Under the Hindu Law she had only a right to maintenance in the joint family, while the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, which is designed to give her better rights, enables her to step into the shoes of her husband and ask for partition. But the interest given to her by the Act is still the limited estate known as the Women's estate. Her right and liabilities in other respects remain the same as they were before the passing of the Act.

If and when she works out a severance of status by suing for partition, the interest of her husband in the property' gets denned and acquires, a separate existence as an entity. This interest will devolve, on her death, on her husband's heirs and not revert to the coparcenary as It has already been disrupted. 

The Act does not, by itself, effect a severance in status. The joint family continues to have the same status as it had at the time oi the death of her husband. The property referred to in Section 3(2) of the Act, is the joint family property held by the coparcenary. The Section provides that the widow shall havt the "same interest as he himself had" in that property at the time of his death. The interest is of a fluctuating character and is liable to be either reduced or augmented on the birth or death of a coparcener. If the husband of the widow had not sued for partition, his interest in the coparcenary property would be open to the risk of fluctuation. .. One of the incidents of a coparcenary property is that no coparcener can predicate what his share is at any definite point of time, unless he gets his share separated by partition, It would be anomalous to held that a widow would be entitled to claim a definite share which her husband could not have... the Act gives the widow just what her husband had, namely, his undivided interest, subject to fluctuations arising out of the varying fortunes of the family. 

8. In a suit for partition the Court has to ascertain who the parties are that are entitled to a share, besides determining the assets and liabilities available for partition. The plaintiff's rights have got to be determined on a consideration of both the factors. 

47. ...Section 3(2) does not operate as severance of the interest of the deceased coparcener. The right which the widow gets under the section is not as heir of her deceased husband. It is a statutory right based on the recognition of the principle that the widow is the surviving half of the deceased husband. The interest which devolves on her is a fluctuating interest. She continues as a member of the joint family till she demands a partition and that she is entitled when she sues for partition to the share of her husband in family properties as they stand at the time of the partition suit and the share to which he would be entitled to then,

Devise and inheritance distinguished

Devise and inheritance distinguished for the purpose of S. 15 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

testamentary disposition  is a devise whereas inheritance is by virtue of devolution of property on intestate

Jayantilal Mansukhlal And Anr. vs Mehta Chhanalal Ambalal AIR 1968 Guj 212, (1968) 0 GLR 129 http://indiankanoon.org/doc/634161/

Dispute regarding S. 15(1) (a) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Kanta’s mother executed a registered will in favour of Kanta. Both died in a fire in the house they were living together. Whether property devolves on Kanta’s husband as she died intestate?

It is clear that Clause (a) deals with devolution of "any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother" and provides that "in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased", the property shall devolve not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but "upon the heirs of the father". The instant case is clearly a case of a devise and not of an inheritance. Kanta's property is indisputably the one which had devolved on her by a "devise" or a "bequest" under the will of her mother Mangu. The words "devise" and "inheritance" are distinct expressions as is apparent from the use of the two distinct words in the explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 clearly relates to inheritance and as such, can have no application in the case of a devise as is the case before us. 

Tansfer of Property in presentae and by Testamentary Disposition - Distinction

the gift executed by holder of life estate cannot survive the cessation of the life estate or stand in the way of the ultimate beneficiary recovering possession on the strength of the bequest in his favour on the coming to an end of the intervening life estate.

Sadhu Singh vs Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors Appeal (civil) 1854 of 2003
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1468380/

19. ....in the case of a transfer in presenti wherein the first clause of the conveyance would prevail over anything that may be found to be repugnant to it later, in the case of a will, every effort must be made to harmonize the various clauses and if that is not possible, it will be last clause that will prevail over the former and giving way to the intention expressed therein.

Ramchandra Shenoy and Another Vs. Mrs. Hilda Brite and others [(1964) 2 S.C.R. 722]

"It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. It is for this reason that where there is a bequest to A even though it be in terms apparently absolute followed by a gift of the same to B absolutely "on" or "after" or "at" A's death, A is prima facie held to take a life interest and B an interest in remainder, the apparently absolute interest of A being cut down to accommodate the interest created in favour of B."

Section 111 of the Indian Succession Act Analysis

Section 111 of the Indian Succession Act

Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma vs Smt Raj Kumari Sharma And Ors 1996 AIR 869, JT 1995 (8) 466 http://indiankanoon.org/doc/408373/

The main limb of Section 111 says that where bequest is made simply to a described class of persons, the bequest shall devolve only upon such members of the class as are alive on the date of the testator's death. The exception appended to Section 111 says that if property is bequeathed to a class of persons/described as standing in a particular degree of kindred/to a specified individual/but their possession of it is deferred until a time later than the death of the testator by reason of a prior bequest, or otherwise/the property shall at that time go to such of them as are alive and to the representatives of any of them who have died since the death of the testator. For the exception to apply, it must first be shown that the bequest is to a class of persons. Then it must be shown that the said class of persons is described as standing in a particular degree of kindred to a specified individual. The third requirement is that the possession of the bequest is deferred until a time later than the death of the testator for one or the other reason. If the above ingredients are satisfied then the property bequeathed devolves upon such persons of the class as are alive on the date of death of the interposer (prior bequest) and upon the representatives of such of those who may have died after the death of the testator but before the death of the interposer. … the words "a specified individual" cannot refer to or mean "the testator". The very Explanation uses both the words "testator" and " a specified individual". If the idea behind the exception was to refer to testator, then it would not have employed the words "a specified individual". Nothing was more simpler than using the words "the testator" instead of the said words actually used. This means that the words " a specified individual" refer to an individual other than the testator. .. In each of those illustrations, the class of persons is described as children or (or the relatives of) a person other than the testator. None of them speaks of a class of persons related as aforesaid to the testator. Once this is so, the exception goes out of the picture. .. the legal heirs of testator - assuming that they constitute a class of persons within the meaning of the exception - are described as standing in a particular degree of kindred to the testator - and not to "a specified individual". … the words "a specified individual" cannot and do not refer to the testator, the exception becomes inapplicable.

S. 119 - unless a contrary intention appears from the Will, a bequest made to a legates, who is not entitled to immediate possession of bequest, gets vested in such legatee on the date of death of the testator. The Explanation appended to the section elucidates the words "unless a contrary intention appears by the Will" occurring in the main limb of the section. The Explanation says inter alia that merely because a prior interest in the bequest is given to some other person, it does not mean that a contrary intention is indicated in the Will. Illustration (iii) is of crucial relevance. It says that where a fund is bequeathed to A for life and after A's death to B, the legacy to B becomes vested in interest in B on the testator's death.