Sunday, August 31, 2014

Section 177 IPC

BISHAN DAS vs STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.
Cr Appeal No 1837       OF 2014

http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41848

6. Section 177 IPC deals with giving  of  false  information.   The ingredients of Section 177 IPC are :-

(i)   That a person must be  legally  bound  to  furnish  information  on  a particular subject  to a public  servant.

(ii)  That he must furnish, as true, information on that  subject  which  he knows or has reason to believe to be false.

HeldSarpanch of  Gram  Panchayat  was  legally bound  to  give  correct   information   and  bound to  issue   a   correct certificate. 

Can Revisional Court Re-appreciate Evidence under Rent Control Act - Apex Court negatived the same

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs Dilbahar Singh CA 6177 OF 2004

http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41852


Conflicting  views  of coordinate three Judge Benches of the Apex Court  as  to  the  meaning,   ambit and    scope     of    the    expression   "legality  and  propriety"and whether in revisional jurisdiction the  High  Court  can  re-appreciate the evidence resulted in a reference to a a larger bench (of five judges). 

Facts : Provisions of Rent Control Act of Haryana, Tamil Nadu and Kerala states in issue.

Issueextent, scope, ambit and meaning of  the  terms  “legality  or propriety”, “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety” and  “legality, regularity or propriety” under the said Act.

Decision : After referring to the law on the subject as prevailing, the Apex Court observed :

27. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘legality’ is  lawfulness.   It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or  doctrine;  the  quality of being legal.

28. The term ‘propriety’ means fitness;  appropriateness,  aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances  or  condition  conformity with requirement; rules  or principle,  rightness, correctness,  justness, accuracy.

29. The terms ‘correctness’ and ‘propriety’  ordinarily  convey  the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its  ordinary meaning  and  substance,  ‘correctness’  is compounded  of  ‘legality’  and ‘propriety’ and that which is legal and proper is ‘correct’.

30. The  expression  “regularity”  with  reference  to   an   order ordinarily relates to the  procedure  being  followed  in  accord  with  the principles of natural justice and fair play.

Referring to the three statutes in issue, the court said at Para 31 : "...None of these statutes confers on  revisional authority the power  as  wide  as  that  of  appellate  court  or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in  Section  115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  The provision under consideration does  not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak  of an appeal in disguise.  Revision does not  lie under these provisions  to bring  the  orders  of  the  Trial  Court/Rent  Controller and   appellate Court/Appellate Authority  for  re-hearing  of  the  issues  raised  in  the original proceedings."

While affirming the view in Lakshmi(supra) the court said at Para 32 : "...The use of two expressions  “appeal”  and  “revision” when used in one statute conferring appellate power  and revisional  power, we think, is not without purpose and  significance.   Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing while  it  is  not  so  in  the  case  of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way  of an ‘appeal’ and so also of a ‘revision’.  If that were  so,  the  revisional power would become  co-extensive  with  that  of  the trial  Court  or  the subordinate Tribunal which is never the  case."

While approving the view in Dattona(supra) the court said "....We are  of  the  view that in the garb of revisional  jurisdiction  under  the  above  three  Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of  second  Court of first appeal  and  the  High  Court  should  not enlarge  the  scope  of revisional jurisdiction to that extent."

The court distinguished the decision in Ram(supra) at Para 33 : "...it rightly observes that revisional power is subject  to well-known limitations inherent in  all  revisional  jurisdictions  and the matter  essentially turns on the  language  of  the  statute  investing  the jurisdiction.  We do not think that there  can  ever  be  objection  to  the above statement."  

Dealing with the controversy centers round  the  following  observation in Ram Dass (supra), “...that  jurisdiction  enables  the  Court  of  revision,  in appropriate cases, to examine the correctness  of  the  findings  of  facts also...”, Apex Court clarified that "... the expression  used conferring  revisional  jurisdiction  is   “legality   and propriety”, the High Court has wider jurisdiction obviously means  that  the power of revision vested in the High Court in the statute is wider than  the power conferred on it under Section 115 of the Code of Civil  Procedure;  it is not confined to the jurisdictional  error  alone.   However,  in  dealing with the findings of fact, the examination of findings of fact by  the  High Court is limited to satisfy itself that the decision is “according to  law”.""

At Para 39, the court approved the view in Rukmini (supra) "the  word “propriety” does not confer power  upon  the  High  Court  to  re-appreciate evidence to  come  to  a  different conclusion  but  its  consideration  of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety  of  the order impugned before it."

43.  .....High  Court  can interfere with incorrect finding of fact must be understood in  the  context where such finding is perverse, based on no evidence or  misreading  of  the evidence or such finding has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking  the material evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous  that  if  allowed to stand, will occasion in miscarriage of justice. 

44. ....A  finding  of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been  arrived  at
without consideration of the material evidence or such  finding   is   based on no evidence or  misreading  of  the  evidence  or  is  grossly  erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of  justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a  finding  according  to  law.   In  that  event,  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of  its  revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts  shall  be  entitled  to  set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper.  The  High  Court  is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety  of  any decision or order impugned  before  it  as  indicated  above.   However,  to
satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of  the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its  power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for  coming to a different finding on facts.  Revisional power  is  not  and  cannot  be equated with the power of reconsideration of all  questions  of  fact  as  a court of first appeal.  Where the High Court is  required  to  be  satisfied that the decision is according to law, it  may  examine  whether  the  order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.

Legal Principles :

Power of High Court to reappreciate evidence in reviional jurisiction is - in order to find out  that the  finding  of facts are based on firm legal basis and are not given on a wrong premise of law.

Revisional power cannot be equated with the  power  of re-consideration of all questions of fact as a Court of first appeal.

Cases discussed by the Apex Court :

Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499]
[2]    Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander and others; [AIR 1988 SC 1422]
[3]    Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and others; [AIR 1960 SC 655]
[4]    Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval;
[(1975) 2 SCC 246]
[5]    M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy
Chettiar; [(1980) 4 SCC 259]
[6]    P.R Krishnamachari v. Lalitha Ammal; [1987 (Supp) SCC 250]
[7]    H.V. Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, Kottayam; [(1969) 2 SCC 194]
[8]     Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla; [(1991) 1 SCC 422]
[9]    Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank; [1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675]
[10]   Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta; [(1999) 6 SCC 222]
[11]   Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and Ors.; [(1999) 1 SCC 141]
[12]   M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan; [(1999) 1 SCC 439]
[13]   Central Tobacco Company v. Chandra Prakash; [1969 UJ 432]
[14]   Bhoolchand and Anr. v. Kay Pee Cee Investments and Anr.; [(1991) 1 SCC 343]
[15]   Ubaiba v. Damodaran; [(1999) 5 SCC 645]
[16]   T. Sivasubramaniam and Ors. v. Kasinath Pujari and Ors.; [(1999) 7 SCC 275]
[17]   Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu; [(2000) 2 SCC 135]
[18]   Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Govindas Purushothamdas and Anr.; [(2001) 3 SCC 445]
[19]   V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka and Ors.; [(2006) 9 SCC 606]
[20]   Olympic Industries v. Mulla Hussainy Bhai Mulla Akberally and Ors.;[(2009) 15 SCC 528]

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Friday, August 29, 2014

Petition to disclose cause of action - Order VII Rule 11(a) of CPC, 1908

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 69-70 OF 2012
Ashraf Kokkur vs K.V. Abdul Khader Etc. decided on 29.08.2014 from 

http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=41853

Legal Principle : 

1. The pleadings, if taken as a whole, required to clearly show that they  constitute the material facts so as to pose a triable issue. The  expression  ‘material  facts’ plainly means facts pertaining to the subject matter and  which  are  relied on by the petitioner.

2. the inquiry under Order VII Rule 11(a)  of  CPC  is  only  as  to whether the facts as pleaded disclose a cause of  action  and  not  complete cause of action.

Apex court referred to para 16 in V.S.  Achuthanandan vs  P.J. Francis (1999) 3 SCC 737

 “16. … So long as the claim discloses some cause of action or  raises  some questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is  weak and  not  likely  to  succeed  is  no  ground  for  striking  it  out.   The implications of the liability of the pleadings  to  be  struck  out  on  the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action  are  generally  more known than clearly understood. …”
                         xxx         xxx         xxx
“… the failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause of action  is distinct from the absence of full particulars. …”

Reference was made to Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V.  Fortune  Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100

“12. … The court has to read the entire  plaint  as  a  whole  to  find  out whether it discloses a cause of action and  if  it  does,  then  the  plaint cannot be rejected by the court exercising the powers under Order 7 Rule  11 of the Code. Essentially, whether the plaint discloses a  cause  of  action, is a question of fact  which  has  to  be  gathered  on  the  basis  of  the averments made in the plaint in its entirety taking those  averments  to  be correct. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which  are  required  to  be proved for obtaining relief and for the said  purpose,  the  material  facts are required to be stated but not  the  evidence  except  in  certain  cases
where the pleadings relied on are in  regard  to  misrepresentation,  fraud, wilful default, undue influence or of  the  same  nature.  So  long  as  the plaint discloses some cause of action which requires  determination  by  the court, the mere fact that in the opinion of the Judge the plaintiff may  not succeed cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint.”


It is apt to mention here what constitutes material facts. Reference is made to :

Harkirat Singh vs Amrinder Singh (2005) 13 SCC 511 -


The phrase 'material facts', therefore, may be said to be those facts upon which a party relies for his claim or defence. In other words, 'material facts' are facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defence depends. What particulars could be said to be 'material facts' would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts and must be stated in the pleading by the party.

.... A distinction between 'material facts' and 'particulars', however, must not be overlooked. 'Material facts' are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. 'Particulars', on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. 'Particulars' thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise. All 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial.

Apex court qouted from Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th edn.); Vol.36; para 38 :

"The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overriding principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises, and incidentally to reduce costs. This function has been variously stated, namely either to limit the generality of the allegations in the pleadings, or to define the issues which have to be tried and for which discovery is required. Each party is entitled to know the case that is intended to be made against him at the trial, and to have such particulars of his opponent's case as will prevent him from being taken by surprise. Particulars enable the other party to decide what evidence he ought to be prepared with and to prepare for the trial. A party is bound by the facts included in the particulars, and he may not rely on any other facts at the trial without obtaining the leave of the court."

Virender Nath Gautam vs Satpal Singh & Ors (2007) 3 SCC 617 :


...What are required to be stated in the petition are material facts to maintain the petition. There is distinction between facta probanda (the facts required to be proved, i.e. material facts) and facta probantia (the facts by means of which they are proved, i.e. particulars or evidence). It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta probanda and not facta probantia. The material facts on which the party relies for his claim are called facta probanda and they must be stated in the pleadings. But the facts or facts by means of which facta probanda (material facts) are proved and which are in the nature of facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue.







Election Petition - Whether Annexures and Schedules form part of the petition

Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar AIR 1968 SC 1079

http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1490444/

13.     .......details of the averments too compendious for being included in the election petition may be set out in the schedules or annexures to the election petition. The law then requires that even though they are outside the election petition, they must be signed and verified, but such annexures or schedules are then treated as integrated with the election petition and copies of them must be served on the respondent if the requirement regarding service of the election petition is to be wholly complied with. But what we have said here does not apply to documents which are merely evidence in the case but which for reasons of clarity and to lend force to the petition are not kept back but produced or filed with the election petitions. They are in no sense an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only evidence of those averments and in proof thereof.

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Thursday, August 28, 2014

Power of Court under S. 148, CPC to enlarge time to do any act prescribed or allowed by this code

SHIVSHANKAR GURGAR v. DILIP (Civil Appeal No. 52 of 2014) decided on JAN 3, 2014
Citation [2014] 1 S.C.R. 18 (sci.nic.in)

Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure :

148. Enlargement of time – Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period not exceeding thirty days in total, even though the period originally fixed or
granted may have expired.

held "such a power can be exercised only in a case where a period is fixed or granted by the court for doing of any act prescribed by this Court. In a compromise decree such as the one on hand, the stipulation that the judgment debtor is required to make the payment of the money within a specified period is a stipulation by agreement between the parties and it is not a period fixed by the court. Therefore, Section 148 CPC has no application to such a situation."

Evidentiary Value of Evidence of Prosecutrix - Caution to be excersised

HEM RAJ S/O. MOTI RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No.9 of 2014) decided on JANUARY 3, 2014

Citation [2014] 1 S.C.R. 9 

Trial under Sections 376 and 450 of the IPC ; Supreme Court held :

6. In a case involving charge of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix is most vital. If it is found credible; if it inspires total confidence, it can be relied upon even sans corroboration. The court may, however, if it is hesitant to place implicit reliance on it, look into other evidence to lend assurance to it short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. [See:
State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (1990) 1 SCC 550]. Such weight is given to the prosecutrix’s evidence because her evidence is on par with the evidence of an injured witness which seldom fails to inspire confidence. Having placed the prosecutrix’s evidence on such a high pedestal, it is the duty of the court to scrutinize it carefully, because in a given case on that lone evidence a man can be sentenced to life imprisonment. The court must, therefore, with its rich experience evaluate such evidence with care and circumspection and only after its conscience is satisfied about its creditworthiness rely upon it.

In this case, prosecutrix was declared hostile; further the prosecution failed to examine Dr. Anjali Shah, who had examined the prosecutrix. Court found prosecutrix’s evidence is so infirm
that it deserves to be rejected. The court observed : "Her brother has come out with a case that the appellant tried to rape the prosecutrix. He did not say that the appellant raped the prosecutrix. Taking an overall view of the matter, we find it difficult to sustain the prosecution case that the prosecutrix was raped by the appellant. This is a case where the appellant must be given benefit of doubt"

Invoking Exception Clause of a Statute

Exception Clause and Exceptional Circumstances go hand in hand. It is always required to be strictly interpreted. Hardship to any individual is no answer to dilution of Exception Clause invocation.

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Exception clause is to be invoked only in exceptional circumstances where the conditions incorporated in the exception clause itself exist. It is a settled legal proposition that exception clause is always required to be strictly interpreted even if there is a hardship to any individual. Exception is provided with the object of taking it out of the scope of the basic law and what is included in it and what legislature desired to be excluded. The natural presumption in law is that but for the proviso, the enacting part of the Section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso, the enacting part should be generally given such a construction which would make the exceptions carved out by the proviso necessary and a construction which would make the exceptions unnecessary and redundant should be avoided. Proviso is used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them separately.

Proviso may change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable.(Vide: S. Sundaram Pillai, etc. v. V.R. Pattabiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582)

Supreme Court on Quantum of Punishment in Dowry Case - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

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SAVARALA SAI SREE v. GURRAMKONDA VASUDEVARAO & ORS. 

Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2014 decided on JANUARY 2, 2014 reported in [2014] 1 S.C.R. 1
link - sci.nic.in (click on publications and supreme court (scr) reports under it)

Appalled by the grossly inadequate sentence Apex Court remanded back matter to the High Court to determine the quantum of punishment.

Facts : The trial Court convicted the respondents under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC) and awarded the sentence of three (3) years and imposed a fine of Rs.2000/- (Rupees two thousand only) and in case of non payment of fine, a further sentence to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three (3) months. They were also convicted under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short ‘Act, 1961’) and imposed a sentence for a period of 3 months each and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/-(Rupees three thousand only) each and in default of payment, they were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month of each of the offence. 

Statutory Provisions :

Section 3 of the Act, 1961 reads as under:

“3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry – (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and with the fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more.

Provided that the Court, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.”

Findings of Supreme Court :

8. In the instant case, the minimum sentence fixed by the legislature is five years, however, the court in an appropriate case after recording the reason may award the sentence lesser than five years, but the fine shall not be less than Rs.15,000/- or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more.

9. In view of the above, we are not able to understand as under what circumstances without recording any reason whatsoever it was permissible for the trial Court to award the sentence less than five (5) years. Awarding of punishment of 3 months by the trial Court was hopelessly disproportionate particularly in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance has been pointed out by the trial court. The High Court failed in its duty to take up the matter in its revisional power under Section 401 r/w Section 386(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and enhance the punishment commensurate to the offence committed by them. We are appalled that the High Court reduced the sentence to four days.

Reliance placed on :

1. State of U.P. v. Shri Kishan, AIR 2005 SC 1250 on just and proper sentence
2. State of Rajasthan v. Vinod Kumar, AIR 2012 SC 2301 on minimum sentence provided under the statute
3. Ram Sanjiwan Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 3265 on exercising the discretion in the exception clause